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ABSTRACT
We re-examine the 2012 local government elections in New
South Wales, Australia. The count was conducted electron-
ically using a randomised form of the Single Transferable
Vote (STV). It was already well known that randomness
does make a difference to outcomes in some seats. We
describe how the process could be amended to include a
demonstration that the randomness was chosen fairly.
Second, and more significantly, we found an error in the of-
ficial counting software, which caused a mistake in the count
in the council of Griffith, where candidate Rina Mercuri nar-
rowly missed out on a seat. We believe the software error
incorrectly decreased Mercuri’s winning probability to about
10%—according to our count she should have won with 91%
probability.
The NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) corrected their
code when we pointed out the error, and made their own an-
nouncement.
We have since investigated the 2016 local government elec-
tion (held after correcting the error above) and found two
new errors. We notified the NSWEC about these errors a
few days after they posted the results.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many Australian elections are tallied electronically, though
a computerised count is hard to scrutinise. Most electoral
commissions make full preference data available, allowing
independent recounts, but sometimes not until months after
the election. Some electoral commissions, including Victo-
ria and the Australian Capital Territory, make the count-
ing code openly available online. Code from the Australian
Electoral Commission and the New South Wales Electoral
Commission (NSWEC) is not available.
If full source code was available there would be more op-
portunity to examine the system to find and correct mistakes
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before, rather than after, the election. Private software cer-
tification is no substitute for public scrutiny.
We reimplemented the NSW count, by reading the NSWEC’s
recently-released functional specification. Our re-computation
of all the 2012 local government results produced two main
results.
• Randomness significantly impacts some NSW local gov-
ernment outcomes. This was already well known, but
not publicly quantified. Our contribution is a specific
suggestion for showing that the randomness is gener-
ated fairly. This is described in Section 3.
• Our count gives a different distribution of preferences
in the council of Griffith in 2012. The official count
contains an error in the computation of the “last par-
cel”. The error decreased Rina Mercuri’s winning prob-
ability to about 10% 1 — according to our count she
should have won with roughly 91% probability. She
was not elected.
We are not at all certain that our count is correct, be-
cause the specification is ambiguous, the legislation is vague,
and of course our code may well contain errors. Our source
code is openly available for analysis at https://github.com/
SiliconEconometrics/PublicService and our full results are
at https://siliconeconometrics.github.io/PublicService/
CountVotes/NSWLGE2012MillionRuns/.
The rest of this section details the counting process used
in NSW. We then describe the software error and the effect
in Griffith. Section 3 explains the impact of randomness
and how to demonstrate that the random choices are fair.
Section 4 describes software errors that we identified in the
ACT code, none of which have affected an election result.
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our
work and the benefits of making election source code avail-
able for public scrutiny.
1.1 The Single Transferable Vote Count
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a proportional,
preferential counting method that transforms voter prefer-
ences into a set of winning candidates.
Before counting, we define the Droop quota as
Q = bv/(s + 1)c+ 1
where s is the number of seats to be filled and v is the
number of voters.
1private communication verified by a modification of our
program
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Counting proceeds in rounds (called “counts”). If nobody
has a quota, the candidate with the lowest tally is excluded
(eliminated) and their votes are redistributed according to
the next preference. (This step is familiar from the UK’s
“alternative vote” and the USA’s “Instant Runoff Vote.”).
Candidates with at least a quota are elected—their excess
over a quota is redistributed according to the next prefer-
ence.
This process has a variety of different variants. For ex-
ample, what should happen when many candidates attain
a quota at the same count? Should their excesses be dis-
tributed immediately, or one after another? What should
happen if a candidate who already has a quota receives votes
from another candidate? etc.
1.2 New South Wales specifics
Legislation (from 2005)2 describes the counting process
in some detail, but without the clarity of a proper software
specification. Importantly, when a candidate exceeds the
quota, the excess votes are distributed using random sam-
pling. It seems intended that the only votes available for
distribution are those received in the last transfer, but no
precise definition of last transfer is given.3
The New South Wales Electoral Commission recently pub-
lished their “Functional Requirements Specification for the
Vote Count,”4. This document does add some detail, for
example about how to deal with multiple simultaneous elec-
tions, but it still omits precise definitions of crucial concepts
such as “count” and “last transfer.”
2. THE CALCULATION OF TRANSFERRABLE
VOTES AND THE CONSEQUENCE IN GRIF-
FITH
The legislation is ambiguous about whether transfers from
multiple candidates elected at the same time should count
as one transfer when selecting the “last transfer” and hence
the transferrable votes. The functional specification deals
explicitly with that case, stating in part 1.4.14.1 that:
When Distributing an Elected Candidate’s votes
only those votes that have been transferred to
a Candidate either from an elected or excluded
candidate resulting in that Candidate attaining
or exceeding the Quota are taken into consider-
ation.
These votes may come from more than one
transfer of elected candidates if and only if more
than one Candidate is elected at a previous Count
and Votes from these distributions are transferred
2http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol reg/
lgr2005328/sch5.html
3However, the more recently written rules for NSW Legisla-
tive Council STV counting, which uses the same software,
explicitly say, “Unless all the vacancies have then been filled,
the surplus votes of the elected candidate shall be transferred
to the continuing candidates in accordance with the provi-
sions of clause 10, but, in the application of those provisions,
only those ballot-papers which have been transferred to the
elected candidate from the candidate last excluded shall be
taken into consideration.” See http://www.legislation.nsw.
gov.au/#/view/act/1902/32/sch6 Point 14(3).
4http://pastvtr.elections.nsw.gov.au/SGE2011/data/
Functional Requirements for Vote Count v3.2.pdf
to the Candidate resulting in the Quota being at-
tained or exceeded
However, pseudocode in the immediately following section
(1.4.14.2, 2(c)) begins searching from the prior count, look-
ing for the last time a candidate was elected or excluded.
Consider a candidate C who exceeds a quota as a result
of the exclusion of candidate E. Suppose that immediately
before E’s exclusion some elected candidates’ votes were dis-
tributed. In this case, according to 1.4.14.2, 2(c), C’s trans-
ferrable votes include those elected candidates’ votes too.
This is an incorrect computation of the “last transfer”. It di-
rectly contradicts the quote above: transferrable votes come
from more than one elected candidate, but those distribu-
tions did not result in the quota being attained or exceeded.
Exactly this scenario occurred in the council of Griffith in
20125.
At count 8, Simon Croce is elected. This results in three
surplus transfers in counts 9,10 and 11. In count 12, Brian
Hopper is excluded. As a result, 99 votes go to Paul Ros-
setto, who thus goes over quota and is elected. (Doug Cur-
ran is also elected at this point, but is irrelevant for this
discussion.) Paul Rossetto has a greater count than Cur-
ran, so Rossetto’s surplus votes will be distributed first, and
indeed, that is what happens at count 13.
This is shown in the table below:
Count Action Votes to
Rossetto
9 Surplus transfer from Napoli 79
10 Surplus transfer from Thorpe 0
11 Surplus transfer from Croce 4
12 Exclusion of Hopper; 99
Rossetto and Curran go over quota
13 Surplus transfer from Rossetto;
182 prefs distributed
The question is, at count 13, which votes should be trans-
ferrable? A reading of 1.4.14.1 seems to imply that the 99
votes transferred to Paul Rossetto in count 12 should be the
ones available for redistribution. But what in fact happens
in the official count is that 182 votes are available for re-
distribution. This is a consequence of the logic of 1.4.14.2,
which also includes the votes Rossetto got in counts 9,10,
and 11, where he got 79, 0 and 4 votes respectively.
This seems to directly contradict the second paragraph in
the 1.4.14.1 quotation above. 83 of the 182 votes do indeed
come from more than one transfer of elected candidates, but
the votes from these distributions did not result in the quota
being reached — it took the later exclusion of Brian Hopper
to do that. This makes a significant difference as if only 99
votes were available, many of them would be exhausted, and
a smaller number of votes could continue at this count. As
Alison Balind gets most of these votes, having more at this
count makes it easier for her to beat the (otherwise slightly
ahead) Rina Mercuri.
Indeed when we run the last transfer calculation as de-
scribed in 1.4.14.2, our results accord closely with those of
the NSW Election Commission, and Alison Balind is elected
with very high probability. However, if we follow 1.4.14.1,
and take the transferable votes to be only those received
5Official counts available at http://www.pastvtr.elections.
nsw.gov.au/LGE2012/Results/LGE2012/PRCC/Griffith/
ProgressCount/
when Brian Hopper was eliminated, the probabilities shift
considerably. Rina Mercury wins with 91% probability.
We can see how this situation was handled in the prior
election to see if it has changed, and indeed it was handled
differently in the previous election, clearly done with differ-
ent software. Consider the 2008 Gwydir general election6
where an analogous situation occurs. In Counts 13 and 14,
surpluses were distributed, giving Gordon 7 votes. No one
was elected or excluded. In Count 15, Reardon is excluded,
giving Gordon 110 votes to go over quota. In Count 16, Gor-
don’s excess votes are now distributed, and the last parcel
is stated to be 110 votes. This is shown in the table below:
Count Action Votes to Gordon
13 Surplus transfer from Egan 0
14 Surplus transfer from King 7
15 Exclusion of Reardon 110
Gordon goes over quota
16 Surplus transfer from Gordon;
110 prefs distributed
Using the same algorithm 1.4.14.2 as in the 2012 count,
Gordon would have 110+7=117 votes to be distributed. So
between the 2008 and 2012 election, the vote counting algo-
rithm changed when the software changed.
2.1 How to correct the 2012 code
We believe the 2008 logic is correct. The 2012 logic could
be corrected by changing the pseudocode in 1.4.14.2 of the
specification, in processing step 2b, by inserting at the start
“If the count when the candidate was elected was an exclu-
sion, set n = 1. Otherwise...” The NSW electoral commis-
sion informed us that they corrected their program when we
pointed out the error.
3. RANDOMNESS IN THE ELECTRONIC
COUNT
Preference distribution by random sampling means that
the same software counting the same votes may produce a
different answer—different margins, different order of elec-
tion, or even different candidates elected. This was publi-
cised by Anthony Green. 7
We ran our algorithm a million times for each contest; the
results are available at https://siliconeconometrics.github.
io/PublicService/CountVotes/NSWLGE2012MillionRuns/
For instance, in the Bankstown South Ward, Vanessa Gauci
has roughly a one in a million shot of being elected. She was
not elected in the official count. But neither was Anne Con-
non in the Mosman contest; she had a 96.8% chance. This
is not a result of the discrepancy in the calculation of “last
parcel”. When you run a large number of elections with
randomised selection for preference distribution, some can-
didates will lose because of bad luck. This is a consequence
of the legislation, not the implementation.
However, neither the source code for the count nor the
method of choosing the randomness are observable by the
public. Without a transparent process showing that the ran-
6Official counts at http://vtr.elections.nsw.gov.au/
LGE2008/LgeFinalCountReports/Gwydir/Council/
GWYDIR-UNDIVIDED.pdf
7http://blogs.abc.net.au/antonygreen/2016/01/
nsw-electoral-law-and-the-problem-of-randomly-elected-
candidates.html
domness is fairly generated, the outcome could be acciden-
tally or deliberately biased. There is no evidence of bias,
but also no evidence that the random choices were fair. In
the next section we show how to provide evidence that the
random choices were fair. Our scheme is easy to implement
in time for the next local council elections.
3.1 Demonstrating fair randomness
Elections generally aim to be fair and to be seen to be
fair. The legislated randomness makes life difficult for the
NSWEC, who have to implement a randomized process, and
be seen to be fair and transparent about it. It is desirable for
the election commission to be able to defend itself against
a candidate who had bad luck and asserts that the count
was biased; it would also be desirable to defend against a
candidate who demands a recount hoping for better luck.
Surprisingly, this is entirely consistent with an electronic
count, provided some simple conditions are met. There is
a well known concept of pseudo-random number generators.
This is a computational device that, given a starting number
(called a seed), produces a long series of numbers that have
many of the properties of random numbers, indeed enough
to fairly implement the NSW count. If you start with the
same seed, you get the same series. This is how computers
generally produce the semblance of randomness.
If you make this seed public, the details of the pseudo-
random number generator public, and the source code of the
counting software public, then anyone else can in principle
replicate the “random” choices exactly to see that they are
done fairly.
Of course, choosing the seed is important. After the full
preference data file has been published, including at the
counting ceremony, the NSWEC could have a public process
for generating the random seed—for example, using dice or
a machine like the Tattslotto machine. Philip Stark’s tools
for Risk Limiting Audits8 combine a transparent process for
initialising the randomness (such as by throwing dice) with
a publicly verifiable process for transforming that random-
ness, using a pseudo-random number generator, into a long
list of random choices. This technique could carry over im-
mediately into the NSW count.
As well as demonstrating the fairness of the count, this
would have the side benefit of making recounts produce ex-
actly the same result assuming no errors are found in the
entry of the paper ballots.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE ACT VOTE COUNT-
ING PROGRAM
The ACT electoral commission does make their vote count-
ing program available. The Logic and Computation Group
at the Australian National University have found three bugs
in the vote-counting module of eVACS to date.
The first bug was a simple for-loop bound error. The
code would work correctly or fail depending on whether the
number of candidates was even or odd. They found it days
before the system was going to be used in a live televised
election count. ACT Elections acknowledged the bug but
asserted that they would have found the bug immediately
upon starting the live count.
8https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/˜stark/Java/Html/
sha256Rand.htm
The second bug was actually an error in the legislation.
To break multi-way ties for a single weakest candidate, the
Hare-Clarke method compares the tallies of the tied can-
didates in previous rounds. The legislation states that one
should go back to the previous round in which all candidates
have an unequal number of votes. So if there are three tied
weakest candidates A, B and C, then one has to return to
the previous round in which their tallies are pairwise dis-
tinct. In the worst case, one may have to return all the way
to the first count in which all their tallies are 0. When they
reported this bug, ACT Elections confirmed that they knew
about the bug and that eVACS used a more sensible ap-
proach where they return to the previous round where one
of the candidates is weaker than the others. They showed
that there are elections where different choices for breaking
such ties can lead to different results.
The third bug was an initialisation error where the code
declared a boolean flag but did not initialise it at the start.
They found that different C compilers gave different results
since they initialise this flag in opposite ways. They also
found example elections where this difference could lead to
different results. The bug was acknowledged by ACT Elec-
tions and repaired.
They have also found two errors in the ACT Elections
Fact Sheet which outlines the counting procedure in plain
language. ACT Elections has acknowledged these bugs and
have also noted that they have been present and have gone
unnoticed for 15 years.
This is a success story for the ACT electoral commission.
Some bugs were fixed before they became an issue.
The NSW legislation and specification has an almost iden-
tical issue for three way tie resolution (sections 1.4.8.1 and
1.4.26 in the specification). We implemented a reasonable
interpretation similar to the ACT’s resolution; the NSW
election commission implemented an alternative reasonable
interpretation (private communication) but have not at the
time of writing incorporated it into the specification or pub-
lished it with the specification. This is an exceedingly rare
issue but should on principle be clarified.
5. IMPLICATION OF BUGS IN CERTIFIED
ELECTION SOFTWARE
Software is notorious for being buggy. Humans can build
vastly complex software projects much faster than any other
type of engineering. Humans are poor at understanding the
complexity as a whole, and testing it, and therefore mak-
ing bug free computer programs is exceedingly difficult. In
some circumstances formal verification is possible, but this
is exceedingly difficult.
The NSWEC tested and certified their software. An ex-
pert in vote counting certified the specification as represent-
ing the law.9 Then an Indian testing company, Birlasoft, cer-
tified the software as representing the specification.10 None
of them noticed the algorithmic error or the inconsistency
in the specification. This is not unreasonable — that sec-
tion of the specification is quite hard to interpret. We only
noticed the problem after spending days trying to reconcile
9https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf
file/0003/171651/PRCC Fn Spec v3.2 Certificate of
Legislative Compliance - Final.pdf
10https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf file/
0004/171652/PRCC LG Birlasoft Test Certificate v3.2.pdf
our results with the NSWEC’s results.
The important lesson from this is that certification of elec-
tion software is not a reason to trust it.
It means that subtle errors may not be noticed for years,
if at all. It is fortunate that this one is observable; the
counts that the NSW election commission put on the web
provide enough information to detect the issue, even if it
took years. The NSWEC did not release the raw votes for
the 2015 state election until after the deadline for disputing
returns had passed, months after the election, too late for
anyone to actually check it.
Of a much more serious concern is the invisible software
that produces the file containing the list of votes to be
counted. An error or security vulnerability in that code
might change an election result without there being any
way for an external observer to detect the problem. This
too is easy to address: there should be an opportunity for
scrutineers to audit the paper ballots against the published
electronic full preference data file.
Since some votes were cast electronically in the 2015 NSW
election using the iVote Internet voting platform in a way
that made it impossible for any scrutineers to verify, it is
impossible for anyone to verify that the list of votes from
iVote is correct. Of course, a malicious hacker who changed
the results could know that the file was incorrect.
6. PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTION SOFT-
WARE SOURCE CODE
There are many reasons why the electoral commissions in
Australia should make their code public before the election.
• It enables external people to notice bugs before the
software is used in an election.
• It makes it easier for external people to verify bugs.
Our software produced a different result — probabilis-
tically — to the official count. If we had not had ac-
cess to some of NSWEC’s probabilistic experimenta-
tion (private communication from NSWEC), the error
in Griffith would have been more difficult to find.
• It is necessary to demonstrate fair randomness for the
NSW randomised counting algorithm.
• It makes it easier for the electoral commission to demon-
strate and defend its integrity.
This is not just a NSW issue. There has been an ef-
fort to obtain access to the Australian Electoral Commis-
sion’s counting program under freedom of information laws.
There was also a senate motion requesting publication of
the code11. These were resisted vigorously and successfully
by the Australian Electoral Commission on the basis of se-
curity concerns and commercial value of the program. The
general consensus amongst security experts is that programs
subject to public scrutiny are more secure. Openness does
not guarantee that all errors or security problems will be
detected, but neither does private certification. The com-
mercial argument seems a somewhat weak argument since
(from practical experience) we found that writing a counting
program is only a couple of days’ work. Testing it adequately
of course takes longer, but public scrutiny would help this.
11http://lee-rhiannon.greensmps.org.au/content/news-
stories/update-public-release-secret-senate-voting-system
7. 2016 NSW LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELEC-
TION
The NSWEC acknowledged and corrected that bug before
the 2016 local government election. However they did not
make source available nor the randomness source public.
We checked the results from the 2016 election, and found
two new errors that resulted in incorrect distribution of pref-
erences in four instances. Our guess is that they did not
affect who was elected, but we are unable to confirm this
without access to the source code. We reported these errors
to the NSWEC within a week of the results being posted
(within the time period for challenges), but have not had
any meaningful response from them.
7.1 Three way ties for elimination
The general approach for STV, when a point in the tally
is reached where all votes above a quota have been redis-
tributed, but not enough candidates have been elected, is
for the candidate with the lowest tally to be chosen for ex-
clusion. Each paper assigned to that candidate is distributed
to the next continuing candidate on the paper’s preference
list. Specific instances of STV have assorted technicalities
around this; one of these is what to do in the case of ties for
the minimum tally.
The NSW specification (section 1.4.26) says that for local
government elections, the tie should be resolved by looking
at prior progressive totals (a countback), and excluding the
candidate who most recently had a lowest tally. If no such tie
break occurs, a random draw is performed. The specification
is somewhat ambiguous in multi-way ties, but a suitable
ruling has been established and given to us informally.
In the Hawkesbury contest however, count 9, Shaun Mid-
dlebrook was incorrectly excluded rather than Michelle Carter,
who had a lower count in the countback (on count 2). Sim-
ilarly in count 20, Jay Graeme was excluded incorrectly in-
stead of John Thomas, who was lower on count 11.
In Campbelltown, count 17, Youssed Raid was incorrectly
excluded instead of Carla Simmons, who was lower on count
14.
In each of these three instances, there was a three way tie.
Possibly that was not tested.
This probable bug happened to not make a difference in
this case, as Campbelltown’s results are the same when run
a million times without this putative bug. Hawkesbury is
similar, although it may change the order of election. Not
having access to the source code we cannot confirm that the
bug is restricted to these two contests.
7.2 Rounding of votes to be transferred dur-
ing excess distribution
When distributing the excess from an elected candidate,
in NSW the choice of excess is implemented defined by trans-
ferring only a portion (defined by a transfer value between 0
and 1) of the votes. This is done by distributing the appro-
priate papers to each candidate based on the next continuing
preference. For each candidate, the number of papers dis-
tributed is multiplied by the transfer value to get the number
of papers transferred. Usually, this number will not be an
integer. Rounding is done by a set of rounding rules defined
in section 1.4.17.1 of the specification. A fixed number will
be rounded up, ordered by largest fractional value (as makes
sense). In case of ties, preference goes to the largest integer
value, then highest values in a countback, then a random
draw. In Bland Shire Council, count 2, the transfer value is
exactly 0.2. Four candidates end up with a fractional value
of 0.6; three of those 4 need to be chosen. The integers are:
MONAGHAN Brian 9
GRELLMAN Peter 7
BAKER Bruce 5
THOMAS Muzz 3
It is unambiguous that the first three should be rounded
up, and the last rounded down. But instead, Bruce Baker
is the candidate who was rounded down, and Muzz Thomas
was rounded up. There is some rounding that the specifi-
cation requires to fixed number of decimal digits. However,
this does not affect the outcome as decimal rounding does
not affect multiples of 0.2.
In the specific case of Bland Shire, the same candidates
are elected in a million runs (although it may affect order
of election). The more serious effect is what this could have
on random number generation (in case the bug causes a
random draw, which is somewhat unlikely to cause the ob-
served outcome, but other possibilities are also somewhat
problematic). This could have a large knock on effect. In
particular, a very similar situation arises in count 3 of Yass
Valley Council. In this particular case the NSWEC round-
ing appears correct, but an undetectable (from the outside)
effect on random number generation is likely to change the
result of the election, as our million runs show Greg Butler
should be elected roughly 56% of the time (but wasn’t in the
official count) while Kim Turner should be elected roughly
36% of the time (and was in the official count). Not having
access to the source code we cannot confirm that this result
was not affected by this bug.
8. CONCLUSION
Randomness in the NSW counting legislation makes it
challenging to demonstrate the fairness of the count. This
can be resolved by making software source code public, and
having a public ceremony for generating the random seed
after the full preference data file is published.
The code for the NSW local government count was in-
correct, despite certification. This probably impacted the
election outcome in Griffith in 2012. The error found was
corrected, but in the next election we detected another two
apparent errors. We could detect this only because we could
verify the count directly and find a mistake.
There are other computerized systems critical for the elec-
tion in NSW and elsewhere that cannot be verified by the
public because the inputs are not available.
When these processes were conducted on paper, scruti-
neers insisted on observing until they were confident the
proper process had been followed. When computers are in-
volved, the same scrutiny is necessary, for the same reasons.
It would be good for democracy, and good for the electoral
commissions, to make election-related source code public be-
fore an election. That doesn’t guarantee that the software
is correct or secure, but it raises the likelihood that errors
will be identified and corrected before an election.
